March 2008 - Commercial Fisheries News

Commercial Fisheries News
Volume 35 Number 7
March 2008

Coast Guard accounts of fishing vessel tragedies
Lady of Grace casualty report blames icing

BOSTON, MA – In a finding that came as no surprise to fishermen familiar with the tragedy, the Coast Guard announced on Jan. 25 that the sinking of the New Bedford-based Lady of Grace in Nantucket Sound on Jan. 26, 2007 with all hands was the result of capsize due to heavy icing.

Coast Guard issues recommendations in Lady Luck report

As a result of the nearly year-long investigation into the sinking of the Lady Luck, Coast Guard investigators issued the following recommendations for changes in marine safety policy.

Recommendation 1 – The Coast Guard should “expedite publishing the stability standards for commercial fishing vessels less than 79' in length.”

Recommendation 2 – The Coast Guard should continue “outreach to fishing communities, highlighting marine casualty evidence of the proper and improper installation of safety gear on fishing vessels.

“It is apparent that the connection of the sea painter to the (life raft) cradle was improper, defective, or improperly installed. The Coast Guard should emphasize the importance of proper weak link installation and educate life raft owners on the weak link’s purpose and life raft deployment theories.

“Based on interviews with fishermen, there may also be a false sense of security with some VMS providers. Some fishermen may be under the impression that VMS is monitored for search and rescue purposes when it is really a living marine resource tool.”

Coast Guard command agreed with both recommendations and indicated it would publish a notice of proposed rule-making on stability standards soon and continue its fishing community outreach and education efforts. /cfn/

“The primary cause of the casualty was most likely attributed to a dramatic decrease in stability due to the added weight from a significant accumulation of ice,” the Coast Guard said.

The investigation resulted in recommendations to revise current Coast Guard regulations that require only vessels 79' and greater in length to conform to stability standards and to re-evaluate how the agency calculates ice buildup danger.

In its recounting of the events leading up to the catastrophic loss of stability, the report describes how the stately blue and white, immaculately maintained 75' vessel left New Bedford on Jan. 23, 2007 and headed to Cultivator Shoal for a routine groundfish trip.

Aboard were: Antonio Barroqueiro, 50, captain; Joao Silva, 50, deckhand; Rogerio Vendura, 54, engineer; and Mario Farinhas, 62, cook and deckhand. Silva’s and Vendura’s names were blacked out in the Coast Guard report but were widely circulated in the press at the time of the accident.

Each of the men had at least 25 years of experience as commercial fishermen and had worked on the Lady of Grace anywhere from five months to three years. Barroqueiro had Phase I Coast Guard drill instructor training and two of the crewmen had attended Coast Guard safety and survival courses.

Training records recovered from the vessel indicated that all crew members had conducted monthly emergency drills and familiarization training, with the last training drill recorded on Jan. 6, 2007. The Lady of Grace received a Coast Guard dockside safety exam on April 11, 2006 and, after fixing two minor problems, received a fishing vessel safety decal a week later.

Deteriorating weather

On Jan. 26, 2007 just before 6 pm, Barroqueiro contacted the vessel owner to say he was cutting the trip short and heading home due to deteriorating weather conditions. He mentioned that the vessel was icing up.

According to the Coast Guard, the National Weather Service had predicted gale force winds of 25-30 knots with gusts up to 40 knots and “freezing spray likely.”

A number of other fishing vessels were returning to port around the same time. The master of the 74' scalloper Debbie Sue told investigators that he had transited Nantucket Sound on a course similar to that of the Lady of Grace seven hours earlier.

“His vessel experienced severe ice buildup, which required his crew to break ice on four occasions prior to reaching the vessel’s homeport of Point Judith,” the report stated.

The Debbie Sue’s crew dealt with 10" of solid ice on the handrails and 6" of solid ice on the top of the pilothouse except for the exhaust stack. The master also reported that everything on deck “from the waist down” was covered with ice and that from the floor of the upper deck on the windward (starboard) side to the waterline on the outer hull there was 4"-6" of ice hanging.

“The master stated, when ‘those areas of ice were broken loose, the vessel actually bobbed back to port,’” the report stated.

In addition, 10"-14" of ice had accumulated on the wire stays on the bow. The report added that 10"-12" of ice had accumulated on the outriggers, which were made of 3"-5" tube steel. The weight was so heavy that the port outrigger bent under it.

Chronology of events

At 10:56 pm on Jan. 26, the Lady of Grace transmitted its last 30-minute contact position ping to VMS provider Boatracs.

The vessel owner had selected an optional service from Boatracs to contact other fishing boats operating in the Lady of Grace’s vicinity if there was a loss of contact with the boat for a period of two hours.

When the Lady of Grace did not send the expected 11:30 pm contact position ping, an automated two-hour position alarm countdown began.

At 1:30 am on Jan. 27, the Lady of Grace appeared on the Boatracs position alarm and personnel called Qualcomm, the satellite provider, to request a manual ping, which was unsuccessful. Boatracs followed up with a standard positioning message at 3:55 am.

At 4:43 am, Boatracs personnel noticed that the positioning message had failed and sent e-mails to three vessels they believed were in the area – Lisa Ann II, Megan Marie, and Fitz-Sea – requesting that they try to contact the Lady of Grace by marine radio. The Lisa Ann II and the Megan Marie acknowledged receiving the e-mails but Coast Guard investigators noted that the Fitz-Sea had caught fire and sank in November 2006.

According to a summary of the report, the Lisa Ann II tried several times to raise the Lady of Grace but received no response and, at 5:06 am, contacted the Coast Guard, which began a series of attempts to track down the vessel, including asking the New Bedford police to check to see if the vessel was in port.

At 6 am, the Coast Guard called the vessel owner to notify him that the vessel was not responding and, at 9:49 am, a helicopter left Air Station Cape Cod to conduct a track-line search from the Lady of Grace’s last known position. Approximately a half-hour later, the helicopter crew spotted an oil sheen in the vicinity of the fishing vessel’s last known position and, that afternoon, a Coast Guard Brant Point rescue boat crew discovered debris.

Over the following days and weeks, divers found and searched the vessel, which was lying on its side in 56' of water 12 miles from Woods Hole in Nantucket Sound. On Jan. 29, they recovered the body of Barroqueiro in the pilothouse. On Feb. 21, they recovered the body of Farinhas in his stateroom.

The Lady of Grace was raised on April 25. A thorough search turned up no sign of the two missing crewmen. The vessel was scrapped on May 14.

Vessel refit

During its investigation, the Coast Guard identified a number of factors that may have contributed to changes in the Lady of Grace’s stability profile. The vessel was modified during the summer of 2006 to operate as a general category “day-scalloper” when not engaged in groundfish dragging operations.

Prior to the refit, in line with “good marine practice” and as required by the vessel’s insurance company, the Lady of Grace underwent an inclining stability test.

According to the report, the naval architect “concluded that the vessel failed every intact stability criterion in all operating conditions when compared to Coast Guard stability standards as outlined in 46 CFR Part 28.”

However, the report continued, “the architect stated this is not uncommon for many commercial fishing vessels.”

The architect laid out a set of conditions the vessel needed to meet in order to comply with those stability standards when configured for day-boat scalloping, including: carrying 20 tons of ice in the fish hold; placing solid ballast under the storeroom; making the door compartments on the sides of the house watertight; filling the aft water tank to no more than 60% of its capacity; carrying no water in the forepeak; and leaving trawl nets and doors off the vessel.

Following these recommendations, a new steel ballast tank was built into the hull as an alternative to the solid ballast. Hinged watertight doors also were installed on the main deck on the port and starboard sides of the house leading to passageways connecting to a forward storage space.

“As this was an insurance requirement and not a regulatory requirement, the vessel was only required to operate within the stability letter operating parameters while conducting day-scallop fishing operations,” the report stated. “No such analysis was performed on the vessel for stern drag fishing, its primary fishery and the fishery engaged in at the time of the incident.

“Therefore, while operating as a stern dragger, the Lady of Grace did not have and was not required to meet the Coast Guard standards for intact stability due to the vessel’s regulatory length (75'),” the Coast Guard said.

As part of the refit, a 27' boom for scallop dredging was installed onboard the vessel.

Safety gear

One of the more disturbing things about the accident was the failure of the EPIRB to immediately sound following the sinking and the failure of the life raft to emerge.

During initial diving operations, the Lady of Grace was observed to be lying on its port side at an estimated 60-degree angle. The life raft was still in its cradle with its hydrostatic release and strap laying in a released condition.

“The life raft came loose from its cradle and floated to the surface when a diver bumped it slightly,” the report stated.

The EPIRB also was located, lodged under a scupper opening in the starboard bulwark aft of the vessel’s superstructure. The report noted that the EPIRB was normally mounted on the starboard side of the aft wheelhouse bulkhead and was designed to float free at 13' of hydrostatic pressure.

“Divers confirmed the release spring of the hydrostatic release had ejected fully, indicating the unit had operated as designed,” the report stated.

In its conclusions, the Coast Guard determined that both life saving devices were prevented from working as designed “by the accumulation of ice, which encased the equipment.”

Once the ice melted, the hydrostatic releases operated as expected although the freed EPIRB floated up and became trapped in the scupper and the life raft remained lodged in its cradle “due to the inclination of the vessel.”

Recommendations

As a result of the investigation and subsequent analysis, the authors of the report recommended that the Coast Guard:

Consider lowering the stability requirement threshold for commercial fishing vessels from 79' and greater in length to 50' and greater in length;

Re-evaluate the “weight of assumed ice” on surfaces above the waterline that it uses when calculating stability formulas for fishing vessels;

Re-evaluate the latitudes at which the weight of ice is considered a factor in stability calculations; and

Evaluate the need to study alternatives to “advise commercial fishing vessel operators on ways to ensure that inflatable life rafts and EPRIBs are able to function as designed during icing conditions.”

Actions

In the action section of the report, the Coast Guard top command indicated that it concurred with the first three recommendations made by investigators. It noted that the agency has indicated its intention to establish stability standards for vessels 50' and greater in length “on several occasions.”

It also said it would undertake a study to determine if the “weight of assumed ice” values it now uses “are the most appropriate for commercial fishing industry vessels.”

And, it said it would consider making the appropriate “weight of assumed ice” a factor in stability calculations when a fishing vessel operates south of 42°N latitude as well as north of 42°.

“This case highlights the fact that significant ice accumulation occurs south of 42°N latitude,” the Coast Guard said.

However, the Coast Guard top command rejected the final recommendation, stating that numerous rules were already on the books that provided “adequate direction to vessel operators for the proper stowage and readiness of inflatable life rafts and other lifesaving items.”

Said the Coast Guard, “Icing is not new to the commercial fishing industry in New England and Alaska. Those responsible for crew safety … should understand the risks and mitigating factors. An operator has both the responsibility for ensuring safety aboard the vessel and the only realistic opportunity to take actions to ensure equipment is ready for use in an emergency.”

Lorelei Stevens

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