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Commercial Fisheries News
Volume 33 Number 6
February 2006
CG investigation tells Northern Edge story
The Coast Guard has concluded its investigation into the sinking of the Northern Edge, which went down on Dec. 20, 2004. Five of the six crewmen aboard died – Capt. Carlos Lopes, mate Ray Richards, and deckhands Glen Crowley, Juan Flores, and Eric Moreno (who is also listed as Eric Guillen). Pedro Furtado survived the disaster.
The names of Furtado and Moreno are blacked out in the Coast Guard’s investigative report but are used here because the Coast Guard made the names public at the time of the accident and they have been widely reported in the press.
The following information was taken primarily from the “background,” “findings,” and “conclusions” sections of the narrative portion of the Coast Guard report and is presented here for one purpose only – to provide our readers with the investigators’ observations in the hope that they may help prevent the loss of life and vessels in the future. –Editor
NEW BEDFORD, MA - The crewmembers of the scalloper Northern Edge had a lot going for them when they left port on Dec. 16, 2004 – a well-maintained, proven vessel, up-to-date safety equipment, and an experienced captain. Still, things went terribly wrong. On the bitter cold evening of Dec. 20, the vessel and five of her six crewmen were lost.
After months of investigation, the Coast Guard basically found that a series of factors, rather than a single event, were to blame for the tragic accident. And, while the owner and operator of the vessel did many things right, more could have been done that would have significantly increased the chances of survival for the crew.
The Northern Edge was a 75' steel vessel built in Cape Canaveral, FL and owned by K&R Fishing Enterprises of New Bedford for the last 25 years.
The Coast Guard report, which blacked out the principal owner’s name, stated, “All indications are that (he) was a conscientious owner who took care of his vessel.”
The report went on to say that two previous captains of the Northern Edge told investigators that the owner “would fix any problems with the boat reported to him and never put undue pressure on them to meet quotas or load up the vessel.”
Crew
Carlos Lopes, 48, was hired by K&R Fishing Enterprises in September 2004 and captained four trips before the Northern Edge’s final voyage. Lopes had worked in the industry for about 25 years, holding every position on a fishing vessel from deckhand to captain. He also owned his own boat for a time.
The investigators added that interviews with people who knew Lopes revealed that “he was not the type of captain to take unnecessary chances with his crew or vessel.”
Lopes’ usual mate had gone to Portugal to visit his sick mother and so was unavailable for the trip. Ray Richards signed on to take his place. Richards had more than 15 years of experience working on scallop vessels. This was his first trip on the Northern Edge.
Glen Crowley also had more than 15 years experience. According to family members, he had no formal life saving training.
Juan Flores was the uncle of Eric Moreno. The report describes them as illegal immigrants from Mexico and stated that investigators were unable to learn anything more about either man.
Pedro Furtado, the sole survivor of the accident, had worked on scallopers in New Bedford for two years and was on his second trip on the Northern Edge with Lopes.
Furtado, who was 22 at the time, told investigators that he had received basic life saving training in his native Portugal when he was 17.
Vessel
Investigators found that two structural modifications were made to the Northern Edge over the years.
The vessel was originally built as a trawler-scalloper. In 1987, the aft net wheels were removed, the net ramps welded over, and a wood aft shucking house was installed.
In February 2003, the stern gantry A-frame was moved forward directly over and around the wheelhouse. The boom pedestals were relocated aft of the wheelhouse and outriggers were installed.
No stability reviews were ever conducted, but none were required and the previous captains reported having no stability concerns. One captain indicated he was confident that the Northern Edge was able to handle the weather conditions experienced on the evening of the sinking.
Of the modifications, the report stated, “Although it is unclear if these alterations degraded the overall stability, it is a possible conclusion.”
The vessel was equipped with two 13' dredges and two winch drums each with 350 fathoms of wire.
Safety exams
The local Coast Guard examiner conducted a voluntary dockside exam of the Northern Edge on Sept. 4, 2004. The examiner directed the vessel owner/master to: “install stern light; provide a bell; repair high water alarm in fish hold; and install coldwater lights on immersion suits.”
The report stated that the high water alarm was immediately repaired. The rest of the directives were addressed by the very next day and a decal was issued.
A later safety boarding at sea on Nov. 11, 2004 found that the life raft and the life raft hydrostatic release inspection dates had expired, as had the EPIRB hydrostatic release, all in November, and the life ring was not properly labeled.
During the accident investigation, the owner provided receipts indicating that the life raft was serviced and the hydrostatic releases were purchased that same month. The owner also told the Coast Guard that the life ring had been stenciled.
The Nov. 11 boarding team also noted that the “captain had not logged required monthly drills for crew,” and acknowledged that, while fishing vessels are required to conduct monthly drills, they are not required to log them.
Seeing no log of monthly drills, the boarding officer picked the youngest crewman, took him into the galley, and had him demonstrate that he could properly don a survival suit. The report noted that he was able to do so “very quickly.”
Another crewman was taken to the life raft on the stern and asked to demonstrate how to deploy it, which the crewman did to the satisfaction of the boarding officer.
Because of these successful demonstrations and the fact that the expirations were less than a month old, the boarding officer did not recommend terminating the voyage.
Situation
On the morning of Dec. 16, 2004, the Northern Edge left New Bedford and headed to the Nantucket Lightship closed area. Because this was a compensation trip to make up for a broken trip in November, the vessel was limited to taking a total of 12,000 pounds of scallops.
In the report, the investigators noted that the “situation section” was based on interviews with the survivor.
The weather for the start of the trip was described as “perfect.” But as the days went by, the captain and crew were watching the forecasts specifically for Monday, Dec. 20 because a gale was predicted.
On Sunday, Dec. 19, they decided to put in a 24-hour work day to get as much done as possible in case they couldn’t fish the next day because of the weather.
At approximately 2 pm on Dec. 20, the weather began picking up. The vessel was 45 miles southeast of Nantucket. At about 4 pm, there was a change of watch and Lopes, Crowley, and Richards met to discuss what they had for a catch and whether they should continue to fish.
“At the time, they had approximately 230 bags (11,500 pounds) in the hold and 10 bushels in two piles of uncut scallops on deck on the port and starboard sides,” the report stated. “On deck, the engine room and galley watertight doors located on the starboard side were open. The main fish hold hatch and the scupper gates were closed.”
After the meeting, Richards said the captain had decided to make one or two more tows to reach their limit and then jog home through the weather.
Abrupt list to starboard
The report described how the seas were approximately 8'-10' and steep due to a strong tide running. Winds were 25-35 knots from the north. Both the seas and winds were striking the vessel on the portside bow quarter.
At about 4:30 pm, the crew set the dredges and began the tow. Lopes was in the wheelhouse and the crewmen, all of them in their oilers, were on deck.
The report then described the accident itself.
At approximately 4:40 pm, “The vessel abruptly listed hard to the starboard side. At the time of the listing both tow cables were almost perpendicular to the starboard stern of the vessel. Water began coming over the starboard rail, filling the main deck.
“The crew yelled up to Captain Lopes in the wheelhouse to release the brakes on the winch drums, which they believe he did because the cable began slacking out.
“With the water trapped on the main deck behind the closed scupper gates, the cable slacking out appeared to make no difference. Then the cable suddenly stopped.”
At this point, an attempt was made to open the starboard scupper gates but there was too much water. Still in the wheelhouse, Lopes ordered the men to the stern.
Life raft
Two of the crew went on top of the aft shucking house and began cutting away the eight-man life raft. They dropped the raft on deck and it was washed overboard.
Furtado, who had removed his oilers, jumped into the water after it. He was able to grab a painter line on the unopened raft container and began swimming back with it to the vessel, where he saw Richards, Crowley, Flores, and Moreno on the portside stern.
He tried to hand the painter line to the men but the vessel “suddenly rolled.” Furtado was knocked underwater. When he resurfaced, he saw the raft, swam to it, pulled on the painter until the raft popped open, and climbed in.
Once inside, Furtado saw Richards trying to swim toward the raft. Richards got to within four meters – a little over 13' – from the raft and then “vanished in the waves.”
Furtado saw the other crewmen standing together apparently “frozen” on the portside stern when the Northern Edge suddenly capsized. He did not see Lopes on deck.
Rescue
Furtado found the flares in the raft and began firing them off to attract the attention of the other vessels around him.
At approximately 4:44 pm, the First Coast Guard District Command Center received an EPIRB signal from the Northern Edge.
While the Diane Marie found the raft within about 10 minutes, the weather conditions were so difficult that it took another half-hour for her crew to get Furtado on board.
Conclusions
In its conclusions, the Coast Guard noted that, as the vessel listed, the water coming over the rail became trapped behind the closed scupper gates and the scallop piles shifted to starboard, although an I-beam amidship on the main deck likely prevented the entire port side pile from shifting.
The investigators concluded that, while the cable started to slack when Lopes released the winch brake, it then stopped, possibly because “either the captain reset the brake or the force of the winds and sea against the portside pushed the vessel back towards the tow” preventing the cable from paying out.
The report stated, “If the tow cable could have been effectively slacked or disconnected, the vessel might have recovered.”
Another probable factor in the vessel’s list and subsequent capsize was the fact that two key watertight doors had been left open.
“The open engine room door may have allowed seawater to (enter) into the engine room resulting in uncontrolled down flooding. The open galley door allowed water to enter the main house,” the report stated. The water that was trapped in the main house “added more weight to the starboard side, further preventing the vessel from righting itself.”
Survival training
As to the loss of the five crewmen, the report made several definitive statements on what could have been done differently.
Life jackets – The report noted that wearing life jackets would have given the men a greater chance of survival.
“The life jackets’ ability to keep them afloat could have helped them reach the raft or get picked up by another vessel before the cold water temperature affected their ability to stay afloat,” the Coast Guard said.
Survival suit storage – The investigators found that the crew’s survival suits were stored in the crew berthing area and the flooding situation may have prevented them from getting there.
“If survival suits were stored on deck, that may have increased the crew’s opportunity to obtain and don their immersion suits or at least take them with them as a flotation device,” the report stated.
Lack of crew training – While logging of drills is not required, no records were discovered to indicate that required crew training or required safety orientation had been conducted.
The investigators noted that “informal training and drills conducted with this crew could have increased the crew’s awareness and may have helped them effectively react to the emergency.”
In a reference to Furtado, the report stated, “Based on (his) descriptions of the training he received and the actions he took during the casualty, it is feasible to conclude that he had received some formal training in life saving and that the training did help him in saving his life.”
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