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Commercial Fisheries News
Volume 37 Number 5
January 2010
Cumulative missteps capsized Costa & Corvo
WOODS HOLE, MA – In what has become an all too familiar story to marine safety experts, Coast Guard investigators have concluded that the sinking of the 74' New Bedford-based Costa & Corvo was the result of a series of missteps over time that added up to suddenly destabilize the vessel, causing it to capsize.
The accident happened on Nov. 13, 2008 approximately 118 miles east of Cape Cod where the Costa & Corvo was fishing in relatively calm seas. Three crewmen were rescued by the 83' Woods Hole-based Mary K, which was in the vicinity. However, the captain of the vessel, 56-year-old Antonio Mesquita of New Bedford, was lost.
According to the timeline of key events in the report, the Costa & Corvo left New Bedford at about 9 am on Nov. 9. Later that day, the vessel’s autopilot stopped working.
Just before the vessel rolled shortly after midnight on Nov. 13, the crew brought up an especially large load of fish. It was so big that Mesquita stepped out of the pilothouse, leaving the vessel in gear traveling at 2-to-3 knots, to help the crew reposition the net.
But as the men worked to move the net on deck, it unexpectedly shifted, and the port trawl door, which wasn’t fully on deck, dipped further outside the hull and into the sea. This sudden shift caused “massive amounts of water” to spill onto the deck. The water was unable to drain off because the deck scuppers were closed.
From this point, things happened fast.
“Due to the unmanned helm and the inoperative autopilot, no corrective rudder changes were initiated to counter environmental factors,” the report stated. “When the vessel continued to list to the port side due to the weight of the catch and the trawl door, the vessel never made a listing correction.”
Mesquita returned to the pilothouse but before he could take any action, the vessel capsized to port. The three crewmen were thrown into the water, wearing only light clothing and no survival suits.
Mary K on scene
The crew of the Mary K, which had been in visual and radio contact with the Costa & Corvo, realized almost immediately that something had happened. The captain contacted the Coast Guard and, during that radio conversation, the Coast Guard received a signal from the Costa & Corvo’s EPIRB.
The Mary K arrived on scene within about 37 minutes and recovered the three crewmen from the water. They had managed to stay afloat by holding on to two life rings.
An extensive search turned up no sign of Mesquita. The investigation concluded that he likely was trapped in the pilothouse and perished.
Key factors
According to the casualty report, the catastrophic loss of stability that led to the vessel capsizing was directly related to the following factors:
The autopilot was out of commission;
The helm was not manned during the haul back;
The port trawl door became partially submerged;
The scuppers were closed during haul back;
The loaded fishing net shifted on deck; and
There was a “lack of awareness” by the master and crew “of the cumulative impact of these factors on the vessel’s stability.”
Other findings
Coast Guard investigators also found that Mesquita and his crew did a lot of things right. They had participated in a safety and survival workshop in New Bedford in 2005 and had had a Coast Guard voluntary dockside exam just days before leaving port.
In fact, the safety examiners found the vessel “to be in good working order with no safety deficiencies,” the report stated. “The vessel’s material condition was deemed not a factor in this casualty.”
And the Costa & Corvo’s EPIRB, life raft, and life rings all deployed and functioned properly.
Recommendation
As a result of this investigation, the report included a recommendation that the Coast Guard continue to pursue lowering the length at which stability requirements for commercial fishing vessels apply from the current 79' or greater in length to 50' or greater in length.
“Casualty data show that vessels under 79' in length have a higher loss rate than vessels over 79'. Many of these losses can be attributed to stability and watertight integrity problems,” the report stated.
The recommendation is consistent with stability requirements that are being considered as part of a regulatory effort to develop amendments to Coast Guard commercial fishing vessel regulations. The advance notice of proposed rule-making for that regulatory initiative was published in March 2008. /cfn/
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